JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE PROBLEM
OF OBSCENITY
Rodney A. Grunes *
During nearly thirty-four years on the Supreme Court, Justice William Brennan, Jr. had an enormous impact on constitutional jurisprudence. A powerful judicial activist appointed by a
conservative president, Brennan was a consistent champion of
freedom of expression, of strict separation of church and state, of
the rights of criminal defendants, and of equality for the poor,
racial minorities and women. He also wrote more opinions than
any other justice on the problem of obscenity. Brennan was "the
tribunal's foremost expert on... the vexatious line between freedom of artistic expression and proscribable obscenity ....
Few public policy problems proved as troublesome or judicially divisive as that of obscenity. This was especially evident
during the Warren Court period, when Justice Brennan was the
Court's chief spokesperson. Despite widespread agreement that
most sexually oriented expression deserved constitutional protection, Brennan was unable to maintain majority support for the
approach he authored in the landmark Roth v. United States and
Alberts v. California (Roth-Alberts) opinion.' The result was confusion as obscenity cases became characterized by an absence of a
majority position, the proliferation of concurring and dissenting
opinions and an increasing reliance on summary per curiam
* Professor of Political Science, Centenary College of Louisiana. B.A., 1963,
Drew University; M.A., 1967, Duke University; Ph.D., 1972, Duke University.
I HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 264 (2d ed. 1985).
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Both Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California
were heard and decided together. In Roth, Roth operated an "adult" book store
and solicited sales by mass mailing advertising circulars and other material. Roth
was convicted under the federal obscenity statute, which precluded the mailing of
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" material. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988). In Alberts,
Alberts operated a mail order business for similar material and was convicted of a
misdemeanor under a similar state statute. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and Whittaker, held that the First Amendment's protection of speech and the press did not extend to obscenity. Based upon the facts
before the Court, ChiefJustice Warren concurred with the majority's holding, but
cautioned against applying the decision too broadly. Id. at 494-95 (Warren, CJ.,
concurring).
Justice Harlan concurred in affirming Albert's conviction by applying a due
process analysis, but dissented on Roth's conviction, arguing that the majority's
"generalizations" were overly broad and could apply to much of the world's great
literature. Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).

789

790

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:789

judgments instead of formal written opinions.' As one critic Observed, the law of obscenity turned "into a constitutional disaster
area." 4
Justice Brennan would not necessarily disagree with this assessment. In a 1986 interview, Brennan conceded that one of his
major "disappointments" was the Court's inability to find "a solution to the definitional horror of obscenity" and that maybe "it
has been my fault." 5 Recently, Brennan recounted that he "put
sixteen years into that damn obscenity thing ....

I tried and I

tried, and I waffled back and forth, and I finally gave up." 6 Thus,
beginning with the 1973 Miller v. California7 and ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton8 decisions of the more conservative Burger Court,
Brennan stopped trying to formulate a definitional standard for
obscenity. "If you can't define it," explained Brennan, "you can't
prosecute people for it. And that's why ... I finally abandoned
the whole effort." 9
With the appointment of four new and more conservative
Justices, the Burger Court was able to achieve majority support
3 For a discussion of the Court's handling of post-Roth-Alberts obscenity cases,
see Rodney A. Grunes, Obscenity Law and the Justices: Reversing Policy on the Supreme
Court, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 403 (1978).
4 C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, in SuP. CT. REV. 59 (Phillip B. Kurland ed., 1966).
5 Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1986, § 6 (magazine),
at 25, 79.
6 Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45,
56.
7 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller was convicted under a state
obscenity statute for mass-mailing advertisements for illustrated "adult" books that
depicted a variety of sexual activities. ChiefJustice Burger, in a five-four decision,
articulated the obscenity test to be "whether (a) 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards,' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest .... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan, in dissent, did not address the obscenity issue, finding the
statute unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
8 413 U.S. 49 (1973). ParisAdult Theatre I, handed down with Miller, upheld a
Georgia statute regulating adult films because the statute comported with the Miller
standards. Justice Brennan, taking a "significant departure" from the Roth approach, dissented because of the inability to clearly delineate the line between protected and unprotected speech. Id. at 86-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Brennan found that the vagueness of the various approaches promulgated by the
Court raised problems of due process and overbreadth and created indecision in
the lower courts.
9 Hentoff, supra note 6, at 56.
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for a new definitional approach to obscenity. Having determined
that the crime of obscenity could not be defined with precision
and that statutes seeking to punish this offense were thereby unconstitutionally vague, Justice Brennan now became the leader of
the dissenters.
Justice Brennan would repeat this argument in numerous
dissenting opinions during the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods, often quoting the precise language from his dissent in Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.'° He has written that dissents are an important part of the judicial process "not only by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority's opinion, but...
also by contributing to the marketplace of competing ideas.""
Moreover, at least one commentator has stated that Brennan's
12
use of the repeated dissent "is a mark of judicial integrity."'
This article examines Justice Brennan's transformation from
primary advocate to leading dissenter in obscenity cases decided
during the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts. It is suggested that Brennan's analysis of his contributions during the
Warren Court period is basically correct. His reliance upon
vague and imprecise constitutional standards undermined his
own commitment to First Amendment freedoms. While Brennan
never adhered to the position that the First Amendment absolutely prohibited Congress, and also the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, from enacting laws abridging freedom of
expression, his balancing of individual and societal interests
seemed to assume that First Amendment freedoms were in a preferred position. As he stated in Roth v. United States:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free
society and are indispensable to its continued growth.... The
door barring federal and state intrusion' into this area cannot
be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the
slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more
important interests."
This article examines and critiques the argument that the Burger Court's anti-libertarian approach to obscenity can be attributed,
in part, to Justice Brennan's failure as a coalition builder during the
1O See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
11 WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435 (1986).
12 Laura Krugman Ray,Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMPLE
L.

REV. 307,
13 Roth v.

327 (1988).
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (citations omitted).
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Warren Court period.' 4
Finally, the article argues that Justice Brennan's dissenting position during the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods was essentially correct: it is not possible to provide a definition or test that
enables a judge or other decision maker to clearly distinguish between sexually explicit material that is entitled to First Amendment
protection and sexually explicit material that is subject to government regulation or suppression because it is obscene.
I.

THE WARREN COURT LEGACY

Justice Brennan's 1957 Roth-Alberts opinion is the first major
obscenity decision of the Warren Court and the last instance
where a majority of the Justices subscribed to his definitional approach for obscenity. While Brennan's approach proved to be
imprecise and confusing, he is not entirely to blame for the
Court's inability to agree on a common approach to resolving
disputes in this policy area. One problem, as Justice Harlan
noted, is that obscenity is an "exquisitely vague crime."' 5 The
federal obscenity statute, for example, prohibits the mailing of
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" material.' 6 Moreover, as is
evident in the numerous concurring and dissenting opinions of
the Warren Court, what is obscene for one justice might be perceived as important artistic expression by another. Finally, one
commentator suggests that "[m]uch of the confusion resulted
from the fact that . . . Chief Justice [Warren] did not play his
usual leadership role. Warren was ambivalent in obscenity
cases."' 17

Brennan also was ambivalent. Unwilling to support Justices
Black and Douglas, the literalists on the Court, Brennan maintained in Roth-Alberts that obscenity could be distinguished from
other categories of speech and that only the latter were protected
under the First Amendment.' a Having adopted this "two-tier"
14 "[Tlhere is evidence that Brennan failed unnecessarily to build majority opinion coalitions. By giving short shrift to the views of such justices as Harlan and
Chief Justice Warren, Brennan may have overlooked opportunities for a flexible,
yet essentially libertarian, compromise position." Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan
and the Development of Obscenity Policy by the Supreme Court, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 410, 425
(1982).
15 See Stanley Fleishman, Obscenity: The Exquisitely Vague Crime, LAw IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY II (Spring 1965) 97-110.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988).
17 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF

18 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).

221 (1983).
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approach,' 9 Brennan argued that "[a]ll ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion" are protected against governmental restraint. 20 On the
other hand, Brennan contended, obscene ideas were subject to
federal and state regulation because they were, by definition, "ut".21
terly without redeeming social importance."2!.
In addition, Brennan provided mixed signals in Roth-Alberts
by appearing to say one thing while doing another. Using very
permissive and libertarian rhetoric, Brennan wrote that "sex and
obscenity are not synonymous," and that "the portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature, and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press."' 22 Yet, the Brennan-led majority articulated
a standard for determining obscenity that resulted in the affirmation of convictions under state and federal obscenity statutes.
Finding none of the older First Amendment tests applicable
in Roth-Alberts, Justice Brennan's task was to develop a standard
that would enable others to clearly distinguish unprotected obscene material from constitutionally protected sexual expression.
Joined by conservative Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and
Whittaker, Brennan proposed the following test: "whether to the
average person applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
23
prurient interest."
Ironically, this test was intended to be more permissive than
the popularly used Regina v. Hicklin 24 test, which judged obscenity by the tendency of isolated passages of the material to corrupt
the minds of those who are susceptible to such influences, especially young people. While the substitution of "dominant" effect
for "isolated passages" and adult values for juvenile values were
improvements, Justice Brennan seemed wedded to the underlying premise of Hicklin that government could regulate the sexu'9

10.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.

CT. REV.,

1,

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 489.
Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). Hicklin was accused of selling
pamphlets containing theological extracts on the practices of the Roman Catholic
Church, which extracts the court found to be obscene. While the reported case
focused on whether Hicklin had the mens rea required under the statute, the Hicklin
definition of obscenity became the standard.
20
21
22
23
24
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ally impure thoughts of its citizens. After all, Brennan defined
expression that appealed to the prurient interest
as "material
25
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.
Moreover, Brennan's reliance on such vague and generally
undefined terms as "average person" and "contemporary community standards" seemed to lack the precision necessary for the
protection of non-obscene or "borderline" sexual material. Yet,
ChiefJustice Warren, who as part of the majority voting coalition
selected Brennan to write the opinion, is reported to
have said
26
that "[i]t's the best we could do with what we had."
Despite considerable criticism from the scholarly commu27
nity, it was not until the 1964 case of Jacobellis v. Ohio 2 1 that
Justice Brennan was willing to re-examine the Roth-Alberts standard. Two years earlier, Brennan had refused to join Justice
Harlan's attempt to refine Roth-Alberts by requiring both "patent
offensiveness" and appeal to the "prurient interest" for a determination of obscenity.29 Brennan found "patent offensiveness"
to be similar to "hard-core" pornography, which he found impossible to define with precision. In a note to Harlan before the
opinion was published, Brennan stated that "we ought let the
widespread ferment continue a bit longer in legal periodicals and
courts over the soundness
and meaning of the Roth test before
' 30
we re-examine it.
There was no "opinion of the Court" inJacobellis.3 ' Perhaps
25 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20.
26 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 220.
27 See Simon Roberts, Comment, The Obscenity Exception: Abusing the First Amendment, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 677, 679 (1989) (contending that Roth resulted from, inter
alia, "a faulty theory of constitutional interpretation"); C.L. Gaylord, The Writing on
the Wall, 89 CASE & COM., July-Aug. 1984, at 48 (The Roth obscenity test-failed to
protect "the young, the immature, and the otherwise susceptible."); Robert E.
Riggs, Miller v. California Revisited: An Empirical Note, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 249
(Roth did not result in suppression of obscenity but, instead, stimulated production
of sexually explicit material); William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 49-50
(1960) (questioning the degree of causal relationship required between the obscene material and the prurient interest, the "average person" standard and the
geographical bounds of the "community" whose standards are to be evaluated).
28 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
29 Manual Enter., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Justice Harlan defined "patent offensiveness" to mean a quality that "affront[s] current community standards
of decency." Id. at 482. Justice Brennan concurred with the majority decision that
reversed a conviction based upon 18 U.S.C. § 1461, but argued in his concurrence
that the Post Office lacked the censorship power to decide what was obscene material. 370 U.S. at 519 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 436.
31 Justice Brennan was joined in the opinion only by Justice Goldberg. Justices
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this should have been expected because three of the conservative
Justices who had supported Brennan in Roth-Alberts (Frankfurter,
Burton and Whittaker) had been replaced by the more liberal Arthur Goldberg, Potter Stewart and Byron White. 2 Because Justice Brennan had applied Roth-Alberts in an increasingly
permissive manner since 1957,1- however, the building of a new
majority coalition for the protection of sexually oriented expression seemed possible.
Although six Justices agreed that Ohio courts had erred in
finding the critically acclaimed motion picture Les Amants obscene, only Justice Goldberg accepted Justice Brennan's interpretation that a national community, rather than a state or local
community, should be used in applying the "contemporary community standards" element of the Roth-Alberts test.34 Two dissenters, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark were especially
unhelpful. While willing to support Roth-Alberts "until a more
satisfactory definition evolved,"'3

-

the dissenters argued for the

use of a local standard instead of a national standard. The dissenters viewed a national standard to be unprovable. Also, it was
unclear whether they accepted Justice Brennan's newly stated
view that the test for obscenity should be applied only after material had been found to be "utterly without redeeming social importance" and went "substantially beyond customary limits of
6
3

candor."1

ByJacobellis, it was clear that the Justices of the Warren Court
were hopelessly divided on how to determine obscenity. While
Justice Brennan was now willing to use Roth-Alberts as a tool for
promoting libertarian outcomes, he was unable to win much support from either liberal or conservative justices. Justices Douglas
and Black, for example, rejected Brennan's "two-tier" approach.
As absolutists, they argued that virtually all sexually oriented exBlack and Douglas concurred in the result and Justices Stewart and Goldberg each
concurred separately. ChiefJustice Warren and Justice Clark joined in a dissenting
opinion and Justice Harlan dissented separately.
32 Justice Stewart replaced Justice Burton in 1958, Justice White replaced Justice
Whittaker in 1962 and Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter in 1962.
33 See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (one paragraph per
curiam opinion reversing obscenity conviction in 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963)); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (one paragraph per curiam opinion reversing obscenity conviction in 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957)); and Sunshine
Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (one paragraph per curiam opinion
reversing obscenity conviction in 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
34 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 198 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 191.
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pression should be granted First Amendment protection.3

7

Jus-

tice Stewart, on the other hand, found vagueness and ambiguity
in the Roth-Alberts obscenity test. He contended that only "hardcore" pornography was not protected, a standard similar to the
one Justice Harlan applied in federal, but not state, obscenity
cases.38 With Justice White preferring the original Roth-Alberts
test 9 and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan disagreeing
with the disposition in Jacobellis, it does not appear that Justice
Brennan had any real opportunity to build a majority coalition.
Justice Brennan's final attempt to win majority support for
Roth-Alberts came in 1966 in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.4 ° In what
amounted to a major reformulation, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Fortas and ChiefJustice Warren, stated that each of the
following elements had to "coalesce" for expression to be suppressed as obscene: "(a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole [must appeal] to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material [must affront] contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material [must be] utterly without redeeming social
value." 4
The elevation of "redeeming social value" to co-equal status
is the most significant aspect of Brennan's reformulation. Because virtually all expression has at least some minimal "social
value," it would appear that this test was designed to be far more
protective of sexually oriented material than was the original
Roth-Alberts formula. Thus, while the Massachusetts courts in
Memoirs may have correctly found John Cleland's book, Fanny
Hill, obscene under the Roth-Alberts analysis, it would now be constitutionally protected under the Memoirs reformulation.
Like Jacobellis, the Memoirs decision produced no majority
viewpoint. At the conference stage, however, Brennan, Warren,
Clark, Harlan and White voted to affirm the finding of obscenity.
Justice Fortas' impassioned appeal that such a ruling would lead
to a new wave of"bookburning," however, convinced Brennan to
change sides and write an opinion to reverse. While Brennan
was able to persuade Chief Justice Warren to join his reversal,
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 198 (Douglas and Black, J.J., concurring).
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart declined to define "hardcore pornography," instead stating that "I know it when I see it." Id.
39 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting).
40 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
41 Id. at 418.
37

38
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Brennan's switch cost him the support of Clark, Harlan and
42
White.
THE VARIABLE OBSCENITY APPROACH

Following his inability to secure majority support in Memoirs,
Justice Brennan abandoned his efforts to reformulate Roth-Alberts
to mobilize a new consensus. Instead, he joined a series of summary per curiam judgments that enabled the generally liberal
Justices to provide protection for sexual expression under each
of their separate tests for determining obscenity.4 3 In addition,
Brennan became the Court's spokesperson for a "variable" approach under which the obscenity of material could be determined by the particular circumstances surrounding its
dissemination and by the material's effect upon the audience that
the material was designed to reach.
Although Chief Justice Warren had suggested a "variable"
approach since Roth-Alberts,4 4 it was not until the Memoirs decision
thatJustice Brennan accepted the view that "the circumstances of
production, sale, and publicity" of the material are relevant to
the determination of obscenity. 4 5 A majority of the Warren
Court adopted the "variable" approach in two highly controversial decisions decided on the same day as Memoirs. In Ginzburg v.
United States, 4 6 Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren
42 SCHWARTZ,

supra note 17, at 619.

43 Most of the opinions simply cited the Court's per curiam opinion in Redrup v.

New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), in which the different views of the Justices had
been summarized. See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v. Ohio,
398 U.S. 434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397
U.S. 319 (1970); Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969); Henry v. Louisiana, 392
U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); I.M. Amusement
Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968).
44 ChiefJustice Warren first proposed a "variable" approach in Roth-Alberts. In
Roth-Alberts, Warren limited his concurrence to the facts before the Court, arguing
that "[t]he line dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or science is
not straight and unwavering ....
[T]he same object may have a different impact,
varying according to the part of the community it reached." Roth-Alberts, 354 U.S.
at 495 (Warren, CJ., concurring).
45 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966).
46 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Justice Black dissented on
the grounds that all expression was protected by the First Amendment and, that
notwithstanding, the majority's "vague and meaningless" criterion subjected defendants to the unbridled discretion of the courts. Id. at 476-78 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented because of his belief that all expression was
constitutionally protected. Id. at 491 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan rejected the majority's conclusions, finding that intent had no
relation to the issue of whether particular material was obscene. Ginzburg, 383 U.S.
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and Justices Fortas, Clark and White, held that publisher intent
to appeal to prurient interests, as revealed by advertising and
marketing techniques, was a relevant factor in determining
whether material was legally obscene. As a result, material that
was not obscene under Roth-Alberts or some other test could still
be found obscene if "commercial exploitation," i.e., "pandering," was evident in the advertising or distribution practices of
the publisher. Thus, by mailing the materials from Intercourse
and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania, and Middlesex, New Jersey, Ginzburg was representing his sexual expression as pornographic; the
"leer of the sensualist" had permeated his advertising.47
48
This same five-Justice majority held, in Mishkin v. New York,
that the "average person" part of Roth-Alberts did not apply when
material was designed to appeal to the prurient interest of deviant groups. 49 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan maintained that "the [Roth-Alberts] prurient-appeal requirement ...

is

satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that
group."50 Thus, by 1966, Brennan had marshalled majority support for placing limitations on the commercial exploitation of sex
and material which appealed to the prurient interest of nonconforming sexual groups.
Apparently, Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren
worked hard to win majority support in Ginzburg and Mishkin.
Justices White and Clark, for example, were persuaded by Brennan to join his majority opinion in both cases after Brennan
agreed, at the draft stage, to move his reformulated definition of
obscenity from the Ginzburg to the Memoirs opinion. Justice Fortas succumbed to Warren's lobbying to join the majority in Ginzburg on the basis of Brennan's pandering rationale instead of the
new Memoirs test.5 The ChiefJustice was especially pleased with
Brennan's coalition-building. Following Brennan's delivery of
the Memoirs, Ginzburg and Mishkin opinions, Warren is reported to
have passed him the following note: "You have made a great
at 497 (HarlanJ., dissenting). Justice Stewart agreed with the dissenters and found
that the Court lacked the constitutional power to arbitrarily choose what works
qualified as obscene because "the First Amendment protects us all with an even
hand." Id. at 501 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 468.
48 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
49 The allegedly obscene material in question focused on sado-masochism, fetishism and homosexuality. Id. at 505.
50

Id. at 508.

51 SCHWARTZ,

supra note 17, at 619-22.
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contribution to the jurisprudence
of our Court and your an' 52
nouncement was superb.

Justice Brennan made one additional contribution to the
Court's development of a "variable" approach to obscenity
when, in Ginsberg v. New York," he recognized the special governmental interest in protecting children. Writing for a six-Justice
majority,54 Brennan stated that, with respect to sexual material, it
was constitutionally permissible to place greater restrictions on
young people's rights than those placed on adults' rights.5 5
Moreover, it was entirely "rational" for a state to conclude, even
without empirical evidence of causation, that exposure to obscenity has a detrimental effect on the moral development of minors. Thus, Brennan extended the Mishkin logic to juveniles.
Material that appealed to the prurient interest of the average minor could be regulated, even though it failed to appeal to the
prurient interest of the average adult.
Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Brennan did not reach the
First Amendment issues in Stanley v. Georgia,5 6 the last major obscenity decision of the Warren Court.5 7 Stanley was convicted
under a state statute for possessing three pornographic films in
his home for his own personal use. In establishing "privacy" as
another special context under the "variable obscenity" jurisprudence, Justice Marshall spoke for a five-Justice majority when he
stated that "the mere ' private possession of obscene matter cannot be made a crime. 58
Justice Marshall's opinion seemed to undermine the underlying assumption of Roth-Alberts that obscenity could be regulated
because of the harm caused by exposure to material that appealed to the "prurient interest." For Marshall, there were no
52

Id. at 623.

53 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg and his wife were con-

victed of selling allegedly obscene material to a 16-year old boy in violation of a
state statute preventing the sale of material containing nudity to minors under the
age of 17.
54 Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices White and
Clark. Justices Harlan and Stewart each concurred separately. Justices Douglas,
Black and Fortas dissented.
55 390 U.S. at 638.
56 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
57 The material was found during a search of Stanley's home after a search warrant was issued based on Stanley's alleged gambling activities.
58 Id. at 559. Justices Stewart, Brennan and White concurred in the result, arguing that the material had been obtained in violation of Stanley's Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Black concurred separately on the grounds that mere
possession of obscene material could not be a crime.
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First Amendment grounds for protecting and preserving individual and public morals by trying to control the content of a person's thoughts. 59 The only legitimate government concerns were
the protection of non-consenting adults from forced exposure to
obscenity and the protection of juveniles.6 ° While Brennan
agreed on the importance of protecting the well-being of
juveniles, he was unwilling to abandon the rationale of Roth-Alberts. To Brennan, obscene material was not protected under the
First Amendment even though possession and use by consenting
adults in the privacy of their homes was protected. 6 '
II.

BRENNAN AS DISSENTER

I:

THE BURGER COURT PERIOD

On June 21, 1973, sixteen years after the landmark Roth-Alberts decision, ChiefJustice Warren Burger announced that a majority of the Court had agreed on a new and more restrictive
approach to defining obscenity. The new policy was set forth in
five opinions,62 all decided by a five-Justice majority consisting of
the four Nixon appointees (the Chief Justice, Justices Harry
Blackmun, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist) and Warren
Court holdover Byron White. There were three main elements
to the Burger Court's approach: the abandonment of the permissive standards and rationales developed during the Warren
Court period, the establishment of a freedom-restricting test for
determining obscenity, and a commitment to defer to federal and
state legislatures in their regulation of obscenity.
The reversal of Warren Court policy and the establishment
of a more restrictive approach to obscenity regulation was first
announced in Miller v. California.6 3 Although the Chief Justice
praised the original Roth-Alberts formula, he argued that the
Court had "veered sharply away" from this policy in Memoirs by
requiring an independent and affirmative determination that the
59 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
60 Id. at 567.

61 See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (Brennan joining in the opinion) and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (Brennan
joining in the opinion).
62 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); and United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973).
63 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller was convicted under a California statute, that incorporated the Memoirs obscenity test, for mass mailing advertisements for "adult"
illustrated books.
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material was "utterly without redeeming social value."' This requirement, reasoned Chief Justice Burger, made it "virtually impossible" to prove obscenity.6 5
In place of Brennan's Memoirs standard, the Miller majority
proposed the following new test for determining obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person applying contemporary
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ....

(b) whether the work depicts or

describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. 6 6
All three parts of this test must be satisfied to find obscenity. Thus,
explained the ChiefJustice, a work that appears to be patently offensive and prurient, such as a medical textbook with graphic descriptions and illustrations of the human anatomy, could still qualify for
First Amendment protection if one of the "serious" values was
present.
In addition to narrowing the boundaries surrounding constitutionally protected sexual material, ChiefJustice Burger claimed that,
by emphasizing sexual conduct and substituting "serious value" for
the "utterly without redeeming social importance" part of Memoirs,
the Miller majority brought greater certainty to the law. Finally,
Burger claimed that greater clarity would be achieved by allowing
the use of state and local community standards instead of national
standards. "It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound . .. ,"
stated Burger, "[to require] that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
67
New York City."
The rationale for the Burger Court's more restrictive obscenity
policy was provided in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 6 1 in which the
defendant showed pornographic films in public theaters and restricted access to adults over the age of twenty-one. Here, the same
five-Justice majority "categorically" rejected the view that material
could acquire constitutional protection by limiting the intended audience to consenting adults. According to Chief Justice Burger,
64 Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
65
66

Id. at 22.

67
68

Id. at 32.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).

Id. at 24 (citations omitted). ChiefJustice Burger expressly rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" factor, noting that no more than three Justices had ever subscribed to that test.
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"the social interest in order and morality," the good health of society as a whole and "protect[ing] the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition"
are legitimate governmental interests that are furthered by regulating obscenity. 69 Finally, the Chief Justice posited that legislatures
could reasonably conclude that exposure to "obscene" materials
may produce antisocial behavior.7 °
Joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart, Justice Brennan dissented from these: pronouncements. Although he maintained that
there was a class of expression that was obscene and thus not entitled to First Amendment protection, Brennan now acknowledged
the futility of his sixteen-year attempt to formulate a precise test or
definition for obscenity. In what was to become his standard response in future obscenity cases, Justice Brennan summarized the
undesirable consequences of failing to provide a satisfactory obscenity test when he stated:
I am forced to conclude that the concept of "obscenity" cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide
fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected
speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress un rotected
speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.7
Therefore, still unable to subscribe to the absolutist jurisprudence
of Justice Douglas, Brennan abandoned his own reformulations of
Roth-Alberts and rejected what he described as the Burger Court's
"restatement" of his original test. All of the tests, including his
own, Brennan asserted, were unacceptable under the "void for
vagueness" doctrine.7 2
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the Burger Court's expansive justifications for government limitations on sexual expression
and indicated support, albeit belated, to the limited state interest
policy advanced by Justice Marshall in Stanley. Explaining his conversion, Brennan stated:
In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the [s]tates apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults
- are trivial or nonexistent, Iam compelled to conclude that
these interests cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judicial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 61-64 (citations omitted).
Id. at 61, 63.
71 ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 83-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69
70
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of unprotected material to consenting adults ....

I would

hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution to
juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the [s]tate and
[fiederal [g]overnments from attempting wholly to suppress
sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly "obscene" contents. Nothing in this approach precludes those
governments from taking action to serve what may be strong
and legitimate interests through regulation of the manner of
distribution of sexually oriented material.7 3
These ideas formed the basis of Brennan's disagreement with
the Burger Court's resolution of the three obscenity cases decided
with Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I. Specifically, Brennan rejected
the extension of the Miller test to non-illustrated sexually explicit
books, 4 the interstate transportation by common carrier of obscene
material for use in the privacy of the home 75 and the importation of
obscene matter designed for personal use and possession.7 6
As Justice Brennan predicted, the new Miller formula did not
end what he called "institutional harms" - the Court's continuing
involvement with the obscenity issue and the difficulties encountered by other courts in comprehending and applying Supreme
Court guidelines. In Hamling v. United States, 7 7 for example, the Burger Court held that the lack of specificity in the federal obscenity
statute with respect to prohibited sexual conduct was acceptable
under Miller and that "local" community standards should be used
in applying Miller to federal obscenity disputes.
Speaking for Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Brennan argued that while the government possessed the authority to "regulate" the distribution of sexual expression, it lacked the power to
"suppress" such material. Because the federal obscenity statute
sought to prevent the mailing of sexually oriented materials, Brennan found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad and facially invalid. Further, Brennan strongly disagreed with the Court's holding
that jurors in federal obscenity cases should determine "contemporary community standards" based upon their own views of what the
"average person" in their community might think. Under such a
policy, explained Brennan, national distributors would have to conId. at 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 122 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 147 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 138 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
77 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
73
74
75
76
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tend "with the community standards of every hamlet into which
78
their goods may wander."

Justice Brennan's warning that Miller would not relieve the
Court of the time-consuming and distasteful task of making independent judgments on the question of obscenity was further
demonstrated in Jenkins v. Georgia.79 After viewing the critically acclaimed motion picture Carnal Knowledge, the Burger Court unanimously reversed the state court determination that the film was
obscene, finding the film to be protected under either the Memoirs or
Miller decisions. As Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, observed in a concurring opinion, "it is clear that as long
as the Miller test remains in effect 'one cannot say with certainty that
material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.' "80
Problems with applying Miller were evident in several later
cases. In Marks v. United States,"' Justice Brennan agreed with the
majority that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precluded the retroactive application of Miller for conduct that occurred
before Miller was decided. But because he found the federal law,
which prohibited the interstate transportation of obscene materials,
to be "overbroad and facially unconstitutional," Brennan disagreed
with the Powell-led majority when it remanded the case for a new
trial using Memoirs and any "benefits" afforded by Miller."2 Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, would have simply reversed the conviction.
In Smith v. United States, 3 the Court again considered the obscenity issue in deciding whether a state legislature could decide
what the "contemporary community standards" should be in an action brought under the federal obscenity statute. Writing for the
same majority that decided Miller,Justice Blackmun held that Iowa's
permissive policy of not proscribing the dissemination of obscenity
to consenting adults could not support a legislative determination
of the "contemporary community standards" to be used in obscenity cases. Nonetheless, the majority affirmed Smith's conviction,
reasoning that the state statute, while not controlling, provided a
relevant indication of the community's mores and standards. Justice
78

Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

79 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).

80 Id. at 164-65 (Bremnan,J., concurring) (quoting his dissent in ParisAdult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
81 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
82 430 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
83 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented. Brennan would have reversed based on his post-Miller view that the federal obscenity statute was overbroad and thus unconstitutional.
The meaning of "contemporary community standards" was not
the only problem the Burger Court faced with the Miller test. In
Ward v. Illinois,84 the Court all but abandoned its commitment to
provide certainty through specificity. In Ward, the Court upheld a
conviction for the sale of sado-masochistic material under an Illinois
law that did not identify prohibited conduct, but which the Illinois
courts construed as incorporating the first two elements of Miller.
Once again, Brennan dissented, finding the state statute overbroad
and unconstitutional on its face. 85 In addition, Brennan agreed with
Justice Stevens' dissenting argument that, because of its inherent
vagueness, obscenity should no longer be regulated through criminal law.8 6
Justice Brennan's view that most obscenity regulations were
overbroad and unconstitutionally vague remained unchanged during the Burger Court period. In 1985, for example, in Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc. ,87 the Burger Court upheld a state nuisance statute which included "lust" in its definition of "prurient." The court
of appeals had found the statute overbroad because it reached constitutionally protected material that merely stimulated healthy sexual responses. Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's decision,
reiterating his now-standard argument that the statute was88 "unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face."
THE EXPANSION OF THE BURGER COURT'S
ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY POLICY

In addition to establishing a new obscenity standard, the
Burger Court sought to advance its anti-pornography policy by
identifying special "contexts" that allowed greater regulation of
sexual expression, whether obscene or not. While Justice Brennan had been the chief spokesperson for "variable" obscenity
during the Warren Court period, Brennan resisted this intrusion
into protected expression.
84
85
86
87
88

Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
Brockett, 472 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Pandering

In Splawn v. California,8 9 the Burger Court expanded upon
the Warren Court's Ginzburg policy and held that a jury could find
a seller of films guilty of obscenity based upon the commercial
exploitation of others involved in the distribution process. In a
dissent joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, Brennan reiterated his view that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and hence void on its face.9 °
B.

Alcoholic Beverage Control

Justice Brennan also dissented in Californiav. LaRue, 9 ' where
a six-Justice majority held that the Twenty-first Amendment empowered the states to prohibit live, non-obscene, sexually explicit
entertainment in establishments licensed to sell liquor by the
drink. Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in a separate dissenting opinion, argued that "[n]othing in the language or history of
the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the [sitates to use their
liquor licensing power as a means for the deliberate inhibition of
protected, even if distasteful, forms of expression." 9 2
C. Nonconsenting Adults andJuveniles
Although he wrote no opinion, Justice Brennan was part of a
six-Justice majority which invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting
a drive-in movie theater from showing films containing nudity on
a screen that was visible from a public street.9" The Court rejected the city's argument that the ordinance was a valid traffic
safety regulation and a valid police power exercise to protect the
morals of minors. The overbreadth of the ordinance, the majority found, unconstitutionally extended into the realm of protected speech.
Justice Brennan did not join with the majority, however, in
New York v. Ferber,9 4 which evaluated the constitutionality of a
state statute prohibiting the dissemination of obscene and nonobscene depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct. The
89 Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
90 431 U.S. at 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also joined in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens that Splawn's conviction violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause because his conduct occurred prior to the inclusion of pandering in
the California statute. Id. at 604 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
92 Id. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93 Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
94 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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Court held that because of the state's compelling interest in protecting children, the prohibition did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Brennan refused to go this far. Although he
recognized that the state had greater leeway in protecting minors
from the harm caused by pornographic material, Brennan was
unwilling to deny First Amendment protection to those depictions of children that have "serious literary, artistic, scientific, or
medical value." 95 Moreover, Brennan asserted that, absent "particular harm" to minors, the state lacked the power to suppress
non-obscene sexually oriented materials.
D.

Zoning

Until 1986, Justice Brennan seemed content to join with
otherJustices in cases where the local government sought to preserve urban neighborhoods by limiting the location and number
of adult entertainment establishments. Thus, in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. ,96 Brennan joined dissents by Justices Blackmun and Stewart, protesting Detroit's attempt to limit the
number and location of adult theatres. As Stewart wrote, the majority's validation of the zoning ordinance was "a drastic departure from established principles of First Amendment law" by
legitimizing "a system of prior restraints and criminal sanctions
to enforce content-based restrictions on the geographic location
of motion picture theaters that exhibit non-obscene but sexually
oriented films." ' 97 And, in Schad v. Mt. Ephraim,9 8 Brennan joined

Justice White's majority opinion that struck down, as constitutionally overbroad, an ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment, including nude dancing.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., however, Justice
Brennan presented his own views on the use of the zoning power
to regulate non-obscene sexual expression. Joined by Justice
Marshall, Brennan disagreed with a seven-Justice majority that
upheld a city zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theatres within 1,000 feet of residential zones, single or multiple family dwellings, churches, parks or schools. While the
location of theatres showing "adult" motion pictures was regulated, other motion picture theatres and other forms of "adult
95 Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
97 Id. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
98

Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).

99 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,

475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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entertainment" were not subject to similar restrictions.
Although the majority argued the zoning ordinance was a "content neutral" time, place and manner regulation, Brennan maintained that the ordinance imposed limitations on the location of
theatres "exclusively on the content of the films shown there." 00
Moreover, Brennan found that the city council had no evidence
that its ordinance would preserve the quality of urban life or
neighborhoods. "In sum," concluded Brennan, "the circumstances here strongly suggest that the ordinance was designed to
suppress expression, even that constitutionally protected, and
thus was not to be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction."101
III.

BRENNAN AS DISSENTER

II:

THE REHNQUIST COURT PERIOD

During the Rehnquist Court period, Brennan continued to
develop his obscenity jurisprudence in dissenting opinions. Yet,
he was able to join parts of the majority opinion in two of five
cases and spoke for the Court in one.
Justice Brennan's final statement on the difficulties in defining obscenity came in Pope v. Illinois. 10 2 In this 1987 case, the
majority' 03 reiterated its view that the "serious value" prong of
Miller was not to be determined on the basis of community standards. The jury, which convicted the defendants of selling obscene magazines, was instructed to apply a state-wide, versus
local-community, standard in determining whether the material
was obscene. While the majority conceded that the jury had been
given contrary instructions, it was unwilling to reverse the obscenity convictions and found the erroneous instruction to be
harmless. "The proper inquiry," explained Justice White, "is not
whether an ordinary member of any given community would find
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in allegedly
obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find
10 4
such value in the material, taken as a whole."'
Brennan's response was two-fold. First, he joined Justice
Stevens' dissent to indicate his agreement that it was unconstitutional to criminalize the possession or sale of obscene materials
100 Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
103 The majority consisted of Justice White, author of the opinion, Chief Justice

Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor and Scalia.
104 Pope, 481 U.S. at 501.
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to consenting adults.'° 5 Second, Brennan dissented separately to
reiterate his position, advanced since 1973, that obscenity could
not be defined with sufficient precision "to provide fair notice to
persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to
prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of
the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very
costly institutional harms." 0 6
Surprisingly, in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,'0 7 Justice
Brennan did not offer his own views on the constitutionality of
Indiana's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(RICO) statute, which allowed Indiana to seize inventory and
close any business that had twice sold allegedly obscene material.
Rather, Brennan again joined the dissent ofJustice Stevens, who
found First Amendment violations in a state scheme which subjected repeat obscenity violators to RICO's massive forfeiture
provisions. "The most realistic interpretation of the Indiana
[l]egislature's intent in making obscenity a RICO predicate offense," explained Stevens, "is to expand beyond traditional prosecution of legally obscene materials into restriction of materials
that, though constitutionally protected, have the same undesired
community's morals as those that are actually
effect on the
8
obscene."

0

Justice Brennan did, however, question the constitutionality
of a federal statute that imposed an outright ban on indecent and
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.' 0 9 In Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FC.C.,"0 involving pre-recorded sexually-oriented telephone messages, Brennan agreed
with the Court that a total ban on "indecent" telephone
messages violated the First Amendment by exceeding the means
necessary to serve the government's compelling interest in
preventing the exposure of minors to such messages."' Brennan
disagreed, however, that the First Amendment permitted the imposition of criminal penalties for "obscene" speech. Citing his
105 Id. at 507 (Stevens,J, dissenting). As Stevens asserted: (1) the erroneous jury
instructions were not "harmless;" (2) the Miller test violated the First Amendment;
and (3) Illinois could not criminalize the sale of magazines to consenting adults
who possessed the constitutional right to read and possess them.
106 481 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
107 Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
108 Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
110 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
' '' Id. at 134 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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standard Paris Adult Theatre I dissent, Brennan argued that the
complete ban on obscene telephonic messages for profit was unconstitutionally overbroad and facially invalid."' He suggested
that a program involving access codes, scrambling and credit
card payments would be a constitutional, feasible and effective
way of serving the government's compelling interest in safeguarding children.
Protecting juveniles was also at issue in Virginia v. American
Booksellers Association,"1 3 Justice Brennan's last majority opinion in
an obscenity case. At issue was the constitutionality of a Virginia
statute that limited the commercial display of sexually explicit
materials if juveniles had access to the materials. Several bookstores and bookseller organizations claimed that the statute was
facially invalid because it placed unnecessary burdens on the
rights of adults and because its implementation would have a
devastating economic impact. They also claimed that the statute
was constitutionally overbroad because it restricted the access of
mature juveniles to works that might be harmful only to the
youngest children. Finally, they claimed that the statute was impermissibly vague because it was impossible to determine what
standard should be used to decide whether material was appropriate for minors of different ages and stages of maturity.
Uncharacteristically, Justice Brennan's opinion was very narrowly drawn. Although agreeing that the plaintiffs had standing
to make a pre-enforcement facial challenge, Brennan declined to
decide the constitutional issues until the state supreme court interpreted key provisions of the statute." 4
In Massachusetts v. Oakes,l"' however, Justice Brennan, unlike
the plurality, was willing to reach the overbreadth issue. In Oakes,
the defendant was convicted under a state statute that prohibited
the use of nude minors in photographs, books and magazines.
Oakes had been charged with taking "sexually provocative" photographs of his "physically mature" fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. The Court vacated the Massachusetts Supreme Court's
decision that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, reaId.
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
114 108 S. Ct. at 643. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently decided that the statute would not reach virtually any of the books stocked by the
distributors and bookstores. See 372 S.E.2d 618 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1525
(1990).
115 Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989).
112
''3
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soning that the repeal of the statute after Oake's conviction rendered the overbreadth issue moot.
AsJustice Brennan noted in a dissentjoined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, an overbreadth challenge could not be mooted
when the narrowing of the statute occurred after a conviction was
made under the statute. Justice Brennan conceded that a statute
would not be invalidated simply because a few conceivable applications would violate the First Amendment. The statute at issue,
however, Brennan found substantially overbroad because its prohibition extended beyond live or simulated sexual conduct to encompass everyday occurrences such as family photographs of
babies and children, the work of artists and filmmakers and nudist family pictures. "The possibility of a substantial number of
realistic applications in contravention of the First Amendment,"
' 6
explained Brennan, "suffices to overturn a statute on its face." "
Justice Brennan's last pronouncement on the overbreadth
doctrine and obscenity was in Osborne v. Ohio, " 7 a child pornography case decided during his final term. In Osborne, the Court, relying on New York v. Ferber,"'8 upheld a state law which made the
mere private possession of child pornography a crime. Although
the statute prohibited the possession of "nude" photographs of
children, the Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to the
Ohio law. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the Ohio
Supreme Court's narrow construction of the state statute, which
limited the reach of the law to "lewd exhibitions of nudity" or
"graphic focus on genitals."
Joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, Brennan contested
the Court's holdings. For Brennan, the Ohio statute, as written,
was "plainly overbroad" because simple nudity was used to define child pornography." 9 Moreover, Brennan found that the
Ohio Supreme Court's narrow construction was still overbroad
because pictures of topless bathers, teenagers in revealing
dresses, a child playing in a bathtub and even a "well-known
commercial advertisement for a suntan lotion show[ing] a dog
pulling down the bottom half of a young girl's bikini" might be
prohibited. 0
Even if the Ohio law was not overbroad, explained Brennan,
116

Id. at 2644 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

117 Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).

118 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
119 101 S. Ct. 1691, 1705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Osborne, 101 S. Ct. at 1708 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the Court erred by misreading Ferber and by failing to extend the
controlling principle of Stanley v. Georgia 121 to child pornography.
Thus, while the production and distribution of child pornography may be subjected to governmental restraint, Brennan reasoned that the First Amendment protected the possession of
child pornography in the privacy of the home. "Mr. Osborne's
pictures may be distasteful," concluded Brennan, "but the Constitution guarantees both his right to possess them privately
and
122
his right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Following the retirement of Justice Brennan at the conclusion of the October 1989 term, Professor Mark Tushnet wrote:
"People call it the Warren Court, but in many ways it was the
Brennan Court. On all the key issues, he put together the coalitions and persuaded the others."' 123 Whatever the merits of this
assessment, it clearly did not apply to the problem of obscenity.
Although Brennan wrote for the Court's majority in RothAlberts, his support came largely from conservative justices who
wanted to sustain the validity of federal and state obscenity statutes. Thus, the disposition of Roth and Alberts proved to be more
significant than the libertarian language that permeated Brennan's opinion. In affirming the convictions in these cases and
placing obscenity beyond the protection of the First Amendment,
Brennan had developed an approach that was contrary to his
generally libertarian jurisprudence." 4
After the Roth-Alberts decision, the majority coalition disintegrated. By 1964,Justices Frankfurter, Burton and Whittaker,
Brennan's conservative supporters in Roth-Alberts, were no longer
on the Court. While Brennan eventually produced a more permissive obscenity test in Memoirs and gained the support of Chief
Justice Warren, this development came too late for many of the
Justices who had already delineated their own positions for determining obscenity. Moreover, two of the most permissive Justices, Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, refused to join any
opinion that did not recognize an absolutist interpretation of the
121 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
122 101 S. Ct. at 1717 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123 Linda Greenhouse, An Activist's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at Al.
124 For a discussion ofJustice Brennan's jurisprudence, see Elizabeth F. Defeis,
Justice William j Brennan, Jr., 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 429 (1986); Tribute to Justice
Brennan, 74 JUDICATURE, Feb.-Mar. 1991, at 238.
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First Amendment. In short, there is little convincing evidence
that the Warren Court's failure to agree on a definitional approach after Roth-Alberts was the result, as some critics have sug25
gested, of Brennan being a poor coalition builder.
But could Justice Brennan have done better? Perhaps. It
was not until the Burger Court, for example, that Brennan embraced the position, suggested by his own opinion in Ginsberg v.
New York 126 and Justice Marshall's in Stanley v. Georgia,1 7 that,
short of the legitimate governmental interests in protecting the
well-being of juveniles and the sensibilities of unconsenting
adults, the First Amendment barred governmental suppression
of sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly obscene content.
While Brennan might be criticized for taking too long to articulate a position on obscenity that was consistent with his overall judicial philosophy, his position on obscenity, albeit mostly in
dissenting opinions, was consistent during the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods. As one commentator explained, Brennan's
approach gave "clear precedence to the exercise of [F]irst
[A]mendment rights by discarding any program for distinguishing among suspect materials. It also ... [took] into account the

special needs of certain vulnerable subgroups.... [and] acknowledge[d] legitimate government interests by permitting content
12
neutral regulation of distribution."'

In the final analysis, Justice Brennan was correct when he
stated that "the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with
sufficient specificity and clarity ....,129 He understood this at
least as early as 1962 when, in responding to a draft opinion by
Justice Harlan that sought to limit obscenity to "hard core" pornography, Brennan wrote: "I have trouble defining 'hard core',
although no trouble at all recognizing it when I see it ....
125
126
127
128
129

See Heck, supra note 14, at 417-25.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
Ray, supra note 11, at 327.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

13o SCHWARTZ,

supra note 17, at 436.

